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1 Introduction
With less than a decade until 2015, theMillennium
Development Goals (MDGs) increasingly seem
likely to be just another set ofmissed development
targets. But is it really beyond our capacity to reduce
under-fives deaths more rapidly, tackle income
poverty and ensure that all children – girls as well
as boys – have the chance to attend primary school?
Surely these are not unrealistic aspirations? But if
we are not currently on track tomeet these targets,
then clearly we are doing something wrong.
Faddism in development thinking shifts the focus
from one issue to another – we need better
governance, less corruption, more community
involvement, a greater role for the private sector,
etc. – though with little apparent success in
sustaining improvements in development
effectiveness. Perhaps all that was needed all along
was more money.
This article first reviews estimates of the resources
required to achieve theMDGs, showing that there
is indeed a financing gap. Critics argue that more
aid will be ineffective. These arguments fall under
three headings: (1) negative returns to aid; (2) lack
of absorptive capacity (on the part of both donor
and recipient governments) and (3) adverse
incentives. These arguments are each dealt with in
turn. It is concluded that there are no serious
constraints on doubling aid, but that the type of
aid matters (more of it should be explicitly pro-
poor) and that some attention does indeed need to
be paid to the recipient government’s commitment
to poverty reduction. But donors need to make
changes in the type of aid that they give and the
means by which they give it.
2 Needs-based aid requirements
Estimating aid requirements has a long history in
the literature. The first model of aid impact, the
two gapmodel ofChenery and Strout (1966), was
based on work undertaken for the United States
Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID) to
estimate the amount of aid required by each country
to sustain Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth
of 10 per cent.1Rather simpler versions of this model
continue to be applied in the ‘external financing
gap’ calculations made by the InternationalFunding
Information Services (IFIS) at country level.2A small
academic literature has also continued in the
tradition of gap models (see, for example Lensink
andVan Bergeijk 1991), arguing the case for higher
aid, though by the late 1990s more attention was
focused on which countries should get aid, rather
than how much in total.3
But there has been a burgeoning of estimates of
aid requirements based on the cost of meeting the
MDGs. Such estimates may be either ‘top down’,
based on global, growth-based calculations, or
‘bottom up’ derived by aggregating sector and
country-specific estimates.4 The World Bank
(Devarajan et al. 2002) used both approaches to
get an estimate of the additional resources required
ofUS$40–60bn, encompassing the Zedillo Report
(UnitedNations 2001) estimate ofUS$50bn a year.
These estimates are fortuitously, and perhaps
suspiciously, close to the political call for the
‘doubling of aid’, which at the time was hovering
around US$50bn a year. Other estimates come in
with higher figures: for example, Vandemoortele’s
(2004) statement that spending on basic services
(health, education and water) alone has an annual
shortfall of US$80bn.
The immediate prospects for aid rising tomatch
these requirements do not look promising.While
from themid-1970s to 1990 aid nearly doubled in
real terms, it then fell in nominal terms: from a high
of US$60.5m in 1992 to just US$48.5m by 1997.
Since then it has recovered.Helped by the declining
dollar, the total jumped to an all time high in 2003,
of US$69.0m. But, this jump aside, the recent
growth of aid has been insufficient to attain the
levels which MDG-based calculations suggest is
needed for the goals to be achieved.
Hence there appears to be a strong
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developmental case for aid. The extramoney may
not be forthcoming on account of a lack of political
will among donors.That is onematter. But are there
also developmental reasons to advise against
doubling aid? Here, three such arguments are
discussed: (1) negative returns to aid, (2) lack of
absorptive capacity and (3) adverse incentives.
3 Arguments against doubling aid
– with rejoinders
3.1 Negative returns to aid
Economists believe in diminishingmarginal returns.
The more input you apply, the less productive it
becomes: the return on the first million aid dollars
is much higher than that on the 100th million.
Diminishing returns may be so severe that they
actually become negative: output actually gets lower
the more input you apply. This idea became
fashionable in the analysis of themacroeconomics
of aid in themid- to late 1990s.The infamous paper
of Burnside and Dollar (2000, the one which
claimed to show that aid only works when the policy
environment is right) included an aid-squared term
in their model, which they said showed negative
returns to aid once it reached just 4 per cent ofGDP:
a share exceeded by many low-income countries,
especially those in Africa. But aid and growth
regressions are, as I have long argued (e.g. White
1992), notoriously unrobust and unreliable
predictors of aid effectiveness. The analysis
conducted by Robert Lensink andmyself (Lensink
and White 2001) put the threshold for possible
negative returns at an aid share of around 50 per
cent of GDP rather than 4 per cent5 – and as a
reviewer of that paper noted, the argument for
negative rather than diminishing returns rests on
rather few observations.
The econometric evidence is thus neither terribly
persuasive nor capable of showing negative returns
for a vast majority of aid recipients, even if aid were
to be doubled. And even if the evidence were to
indicate possible negative returns, it is still necessary
to identify plausible reasons for this, which the
econometrics cannot give us. There are two such
arguments: (1) adverse macro impact of aid and
(2) absorptive capacity constraints, which are
discussed in the next section.
Some fear that there may be adverse
macroeconomic repercussions from large aid
inflows.Much of this comes down to whether the
economy is demand or supply constrained. If the
economy is supply constrained, then if aid is just
increasing demand, it will be inflationary, resulting
in an appreciation of the real exchange rate (i.e. aid
as Dutch disease). But these inflationary effects are
offset by three means: (1) the extent to which the
aid is used in a way to alleviate supply bottlenecks
(e.g. building infrastructure), (2) if the demand is
met with imports and (3) if the aid is added to
reserves withno increase in domesticmoney supply.
As a result of these mechanisms, the actual
inflationary impact of aid willbe considerably muted
in a supply-constrained economy. But if the
economy is demand constrained (admittedly
unlikely in most developing countries), then the
aid provides a means of increasing demand. In
general, it may be said that fears of adverse macro
repercussions are overstated, though it does depend
on how the aid is used.
3.2 Absorptive capacity constraints
The absorptive capacity constraint is the limited
ability to use aid effectively. Simply stating it as such
is a circular explanation of diminishing returns –
aid has negative returns because of absorptive
capacity constraints, which means a limit on the
ability to utilise aid effectively. To have some
explanatory power we need to elaborate on the
nature of this constraint. Although attention has
focused on absorptive capacity constraints on the
part of the recipient, the real constraints may in fact
rest with the donor, who may also generate the
recipient ‘constraint’.
Donor constraint means that the donor agency
does not have the capacity to disburse or supervise
a larger aid volume. The physical capacity to
disburse cannot seriously be an issue – they just
need to write bigger cheques, or a few more of them.
The issue for donors is that they feel unable to
supervise a larger volume of aid. Herein lies an
argument that theremay be negative returns – with
weaker supervision, the recipient squanders the
money on white elephants whichprove to be adrain
on resources. To accept this argument, one has to
believe that developing country governments, 40
years on after independence and with 40 years of
donor technical assistance, are incapable of spending
money for themselves. This is the view that there
is limited absorptive capacity in recipient countries,
which Ideal with below.But donors need to “lighten
up”.At best it may be that excessivemonitoring on
the part of donors, the “need” for which limits the
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amount of aid they can give, is unnecessary. But at
worst, the excessive monitoring is the root cause
of recipient ‘incapacity’ – as recipient government
officials are too busy managing donors to spend
time delivering government services. The harmful
effects of donor proliferation have been well
documented (e.g.Morss 1984). Proliferation comes
both fromdonors spreading their aid over toomany
countries so each government has to deal with a
plethora of different donors (seeWhite 2002 and
Acharya et al. 2004 for data and discussion) and
from a reliance on aid projects rather than funding
government activities, with separate reporting
requirements for all of these projects. The latter
problem is in principle dealt with through the use
of sector programmes, though in reality many sector
programmes actually comprise a large number of
traditional project-style activities: the share of
genuine budget support (sector or otherwise)
remains low.Donor harmonisation, although once
again on the Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) agenda, has a long way to go.
Turning to recipients, the view that the real
problem is limited absorptive capacity rather than
limited resources, does not sit comfortably with
what one sees on the ground in terms of schools
with inadequate furniture and textbooks, clinics
without drugs, poorly maintained roads, rural areas
in need of infrastructure or urban settlements in
need of water and sanitation. There is need
everywhere, and meeting these needs is what
achieving theMDGs is about. But, it is argued, it is
no good throwing money at these problems, since
the line ministries do not have the staff able to
handle implementation of these programmes. This
may have been true in some countries 40 years ago,
but is far less credible today when professional level
government staff are educated to at least degree
level, andmany, even in district offices,haveMasters
degrees from universities overseas. Travelling
throughout several countries, I have been
consistently impressedby the dedication,motivation
and ability of staff in district offices. If they are not
performing their functions to their fullest ability, it
is because they do not have the resources to do so,
not because they do not have the ability.One story
illustrates this point.
The social fund in Zambia hands money directly
to community-level project committees to purchase
materials and hire contractors to build new school
blocks and health clinics. But district officials are
responsible for monitoring the construction of these
buildings.TheDistrict Education Buildings Officer
in a district in central Zambia indicated that he
probably spent half of his time visiting construction
being financed by the social fund, or checking on
maintenance arrangements in recently completed
facilities.When asked if this did not take him away
from doing his job (as critics of social funds are
always looking for arguments that these funds
undermine government) he replied ‘but this is my
job. Before the social fund there was nothing to do
and I sat around reading the paper. I am a Buildings
Officer and now, because of the social fund, there
are buildings for me to inspect’. The availability of
resources has harnessed the untapped skills of this
professional, and many others like him across the
country.
This Buildings Officer is but just one example
of literally thousands of underemployed officials
in government offices across the developing world.
Diminishing returns occur because an input
becomes too abundant relative to the other inputs.
But the labour to administer increased aid flows is
not in short supply, especially if it is channelled
through district offices which, after some years of
decentralisation, are well staffed in terms of both
quantity and quality. There is no shortage of staff
to give immunisations, supervise school feeding
programmes using locally procured food stuffs, and
administer conditional cash transfers.The constraint
is the lack of resources both to finance these
programmes and the small amounts required for
these officers to be able to visit the field frequently
enough to run programmes.
There is no shortage of project-level evidence
that aid-financing of suchprogrammes has beneficial
effects. For example, Bangladesh, a country deemed
to have a corrupt government and an inefficient
bureaucracy, has achieved dramatic reductions in
fertility, through a government-run family planning
programme, and under-fives mortality, partly
through government-delivered immunisation.That
there are fewer success stories may be because of
donor propensity to spend on the wrong things –
most notably technical assistance. All of USAID’s
support to education is technical assistance, for
example a project in Ghana provides training to
teachers to put desks in circles rather than rows
and to display posters on the wall. There may be
good pedagogical reasons for this, but it is of little
help in the large number of schools in poor areas
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that do not even have desks. In the words of one
teacher: ‘I’d like to put posters on my classroom
wall, but I don’t have any posters. In fact, as you
can see, I don’t have any walls’ (quoted in Kraft et
al. 1995).6 Similarly, the belief in the importance
of social capital is prompting a trend to spend aid
money ‘teaching people to hold meetings’, which
flies in face of both the theoretical and the empirical
evidence that community organisation is a latent
resourcemobilised by accessing external resources7
– as the case of social funds in Zambia has shown.
But if many project financed activities appear to
go well, why will aid not help? The final argument
against givingmore aid is that there will be adverse
impacts on the general policy environment or on
government spending patterns (fungibility).
3.3 Adverse incentives and fungibility
This brings us to adverse incentive arguments,
which claim that awarding aid on a needs basis will
encourage countries to remain needy. This means
that allocating aid to, for example, countries with
high infant mortality provides an incentive to not
reduce mortality. Putting it like this, I hope makes
it sound as implausible as it probably is.However,
proponents of this view suggest two channels
through which it may operate. The first is that
governments may postpone necessary policy
changes so that aid props up inefficient policy
regimes. The second view is that if aid finances
developmental activities, then the government will
use its own resources for less desirable activities.
These arguments are dealt with in turn.
The argument that aid discourages policy change
has less force today than it might have had 10–15
years ago, since nearly all countries in the developing
world have undertaken massive policy change
during this period and are not today beset by what
are deemed to be ‘bad policies’. This is not to say
that aid has been responsible for these changes.
The ‘failure of conditionality’ is now a byword in
the literature (e.g.Killick 1998; White andDijkstra
2003). One reason for this failure is that it is
domestic politics, not aid, that drives policy change;
in the words of Killick: ‘domestic political
calculations dominate decisions about economic
policy and donor agencies are relatively powerless
in the face of this’ (1998: 151–2). In other words,
even if cases of bad policy can be found, it is only
rarely that aid will affect these policies for better or
for worse.8
Returning to our mortality example, suppose
the government withdraws its own resources from,
say, immunisation, if aid is available to finance it.
There are two ways to address this problem. The
first is monitoring the use of aid funds and the
second more general, monitoring of government
spending, thus introducing an element of
conditionality or selectivity.These arguments require
elaboration, since they are an important part of the
case for expanding aid.
There are many things which can be done to
assist countries to meet the MDGs: help achieve
full immunisation coverage, especially in Africa
where it has stagnated at unacceptably low levels;
support various means of getting children in school,
such as school rehabilitation and conditional cash
transfers, and to improve the quality of schooling,
supporting textbook provision and incentive
payments to teachers in rural areas, school feeding
programmes; small-scale rural infrastructure and
so on. The papers in the book edited by Richard
Black andmyself (Black andWhite 2004) identify
many publicly supported actions and programmes
that can be undertaken to achieve theMDGs.Very
many of these things are not being done at present.
If aid finances a new activity, then there is no scope
for fungibility, so that monitoring that aid is used
for the intended purpose is simply a matter of
verifying project outputs, which is routinely done
by all agencies.However, there are some things that
donors finance which the government might also
do. In this case, the aid is fungible – it has to be so
unless the donor finances something the
government would never dreamof doing (in which
case it is a bad government, or the donor wants to
fund something the country does not really need
– whichmay be true of most technical assistance).
The response to fungibility is to monitor the
government’s use of its own funds. If the government
is “bad” and not spending on the right things, then
project aid can be given, since it will not be fungible
– of course there may be governments which are
so hopelessly corrupt that aid should not be directed
through that route at all, though there may be a
case for aid through non-governmental
organisations (NGOs). But if the government is
already spending on the right things, then aid will
be fungible, but so what? Indeed why give such a
country project aid at all – since the government is
using its own resources wisely, why not simply
supplement those resources with budget support?
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There is an ‘ideal type’ here of aid disbursed entirely
through budgets spent on government programmes,
and monitored and evaluated as part of the
government’s own accountability system. That
reality falls so far short of this ideal type is the fault
of donors not recipients.
The above argument appears to endorse either
ex ante conditionality – giving money conditional
on countries adopting the right policies – or ex post
selectivity – givingmoney to those countries which
have adopted the right policies.This is so, but what
is being supported departs considerably from
current donor practices in conditionality, and the
tendency of donors to micro-manage the policy
process. It is far from clear that donors know what
is best for developing countries, so there can be
disagreements as to the appropriate policies to
adopt, and the right composition of government
spending. Two related changes are required on the
part of donors. The first is to act with a bit more
humility in policy dialogue – so it does indeed
become a genuine dialogue in which donors may
help support public spaces for policy debates, rather
than dictate the outcome of those debates in a one-
sided policy monologue (see White and Dijkstra
2003, for an elaboration of this argument). The
second is to reserve variations in aid for obvious
departures into bad practice, i.e. excessive
conspicuous consumption on the part of
government, or spending patterns which are
insufficiently pro-poor.
Pro-poor spending is not an area in whichdonors
have themselves excelled. Estimates (e.g. White
1996) suggest that less than one-fifth of aid is spent
in a way that directly benefits the poor. There is
clearly scope for improvement.Here, incentives do
play apart. If the donor provides incentives todesign
aid programmes in ways that will not benefit the
poor – excessive funding of workshops and overseas
travel – then it should be no surprise that
government officials take advantage of it.
4 Conclusion
It has been argued here that a financing gap exists
in the sense that additional funds are required to
assist countries to attain the MDGs. There is no
shortage of things whichmay be financed with these
resources: immunisation, school rehabilitation,
school feeding programmes, rural infrastructure
and so on. The various arguments as to why aid
should not be increased are dismissed, though there
are implications for aid management. More aid
should be used for activities which directly reduce
poverty, with more emphasis on providing goods
and services for the poor and less on technical
assistance. But as far as possible, aid should fund
government-executed programmes, rather than
work on a project basis.
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Notes
1. At present, 5 per cent is seen as a respectable target, but
in the 1960s many developing countries were achieving
growth rates higher than this.
2. For critical views of the use of this model by the IFIS, see
Tarp (1993) and Easterly (1999). For a defence, see
Ranaweera (2003).
3. That is, the prescriptive aid allocationmodels (discussed
below) take the total aid budget as given.
4. For an excellent review of methodologies and some
estimates see Heuty (n.d.).
5. We also point out that the Burnside andDollar estimates
use PPPGDP, so that at actual exchange rates their ‘turning
point’ is at just under 20 per cent of GDP.
6. World Bank (2004) presents evidence on the importance
of school building and textbook supply for school
attainment and achievement in Ghana, and that some
schools remain deficient in availability of these and other
inputs.
7. SeeWhite (2003) for a game theory model showing how
external finance generates community participation, and
Krishna (2002) for the argument that having someone
who can access external resources is what makes the
capacity to organise important.
8. A related argument is the view that aid will only work
when the policy environment is right, i.e. the view put
forward in theWorld Bank’s Assessing Aid report (World
Bank 1998). This analysis has been heavily critiqued on
many grounds (e.g. Lensink andWhite 2000).
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